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MARK TUSHNET
1
There are some obvious things to say about research and the justice mission
of law schools, and many other contributors to this discussion have said them.
For example, jurisprudence  lies at the core of the classical  legal curriculum,
and-at least in the contemporary law school-definitions of justice are part
of  the jurisprudence  syllabus.2  Because  the  concept  of  justice  is  not
self-defining, conceptual inquiry into the meaning of justice, a traditional mode
of legal research, is recurrently needed. In this way, research is tightly linked
to the justice mission of law schools.
Jurisprudential  research, though, tends to be conducted  on a  rather high
level of abstraction. We could refine the definition of research  to incorporate
inquiry into whether particular reform proposals (or the status quo) promote
justice. I  am skeptical about how useful such a redefinition would be, however.
Reform  proposals  deal  with  complex  institutions,  and  changes  in  their
operation  are likely  to  have equally  complex  ramifications.  I suspect  that
jurisprudential inquiries into justice are likely  to do no more than point out
areas of empirical inquiry:  "You ought to think about whether modifying this
institution in that way will make the worst off materially better off, adversely
affect  incentives  in ways  that  will reduce  substantially the  overall  level  of
material well-being in society, and so on."3
In mentioning  empirical  inquiry, I have  indicated  how  another  form of
research is part of the law school's justice mission. We could simply stipulate
that  something-improving  the  material  condition  of  the  worst  off,  for
example-would  advance  justice, and  then  ask whether  a  proposed
reform-residential  rent  control for low-income  tenants,  for example-will
actually serve the stipulated goal. I use the example of residential rent control
because there  is substantial literature on the question I have raised.4 Much of
the literature is polemical and relies overly heavily on economic models. But,
the  best  scholarly  writing  on  the subject  has  shown  that  the underlying
question is fundamentally empirical. The consensus among economists is that
residential rent control does not improve the material conditions of the worst
1  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
2A  generation  ago,  perhaps  the  syllabus  dealt  exclusively  with  the
question, "What is Law?," but no longer.
3These  questions  are  regularly  raised  in connection  with John  Rawls's
theory of justice.
4 See,  e.g.,  Richard  A.  Epstein,  Rent  Control and  the  Theory  of  Efficient
Regulation,  54 BROOK.  L. REV. 741 (1988); Lawrence C. Becker, Responses, Rent
Control is not a Taking, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1215  (1989).
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off, because-their  models  show-it reduces  investment  in  expanding  the
stock of housing or in maintaining the existing stock. Yet, closer examination
of  the  models  shows  that, even  on  the  standard  versions,  under  some
circumstances residential rent control can indeed "work" in the justice sense.5
Sophisticated  economists  reply  that  the  conditions  under  which  this  will
happen are unusual and rarely encountered.6 At this point, though, the need
for empirical inquiry should be apparent.
A second  example  is  the so-called  "critique of rights." The version of the
critique that I prefer contends that in the contemporary United States, recourse
to the rhetoric of rights, with its concomitant appeal to courts for redress, is
unlikely  to  advance  the  cause  of  what  I have  called  tie "party  of
humanity"-the interests of the worst off.7 The most powerful responses to the
critique of rights, by Patricia Williams and Elizabeth Schneider, have relied on
the  experience  of  the  civil  rights  and  women's  movements  in  the  last
half-century  in contending  that, as a matter of historical  fact, the rhetoric  of
rights did advance the cause of the party of humanity and that, when combined
with other  appeals which activists always have available, it continues  to be
worth articulating.8
Of course I have my own views on these claims, but for the present my point
is only that they are intensely empirical on both sides. To some extent, research
into the ways in which rights rhetoric and appeals to the courts interacted with
other forms of activism, and into the outcomes of different strategies,  will be
historical and sociological. 9 Yet, an important component will almost certainly
be  "legal," because  the  inquiry  will  have  to examine  precisely  what  legal
arguments were made and what ones were "available" within the legal culture
at  particular  times.  Although  this  sort  of  research  may  have  to  be
interdisciplinary, it seems an integral part of the justice mission of law schools.
5See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability  on Low
Income Housing: "Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST.  U.  L. REV. 485 (1987);
Note, Reassessing Rent Control:  Its Economic Impact in a  Gentrifying Housing
Market, 101 HARV. L. REV.  1835 (1988).
6The  most  sophisticated  version  would,  I  suppose,  argue  that  the
conditions under which rent control works are rarely encountered in political
settings where rent control is a reform that has some chance of being adopted.
7For my most recent discussion, see Mark V. Tushnet, Rights: An Essay in
Informal Political  Theory, 17 POL. & Soc'Y 403 (1989).
8 PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS,  THE  ALCHEMY OF RACE AND  RIGHTS 146-65 (1991);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives  from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 589 (1986).
9For one of my works that can be  interpreted in this way, see  MARK  V.
TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST  SEGREGATED  EDUCATION,
1925-1950(1987).
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There is another type of research into the justice mission of law schools. This
would ask, "To what extent do-or can-law  schools advance justice?" Law
schools are, after all, professional schools, most of whose students will become
participants in the "ordinary"--and therefore status quo oriented-practice of
law. The ordinary  practice  of law includes some  elements  of moderate  law
reform, and if the status quo, moderately reformed, will satisfy the demands
of justice, then almost by definition law schools can advance justice too.10
If,  however, justice  requires  more  substantial  alterations  in  public  and
private institutions than are usually on the agenda of the ordinary practice of
law, the question I have raised becomes  a serious  one. Before  answering it,
though, we would have to know what our graduates do. To know whether law
schools can perform their justice mission, that is, we must engage in research
about what law schools do-what sorts of lawyers we produce, and the like.11
As I have  suggested, another  dimension of  this inquiry is, "What are the
constraints on the possibility that law schools can perform whatever  justice
missionwe believe itappropriate to assign them?" Although there are a number
of constraints, I think it important to mention particularly the fiscal ones. Law
schools provide notoriously inexpensive graduate educations, in the sense that
we have a low  cost-per-student  compared  to  other forms of graduate,  and
particularly professional, education. To the extent that performing the justice
mission  increases  the  costs  of  legal  education-either  by  requiring  more
expensive forms of teaching, or by reducing the support law schools get from
public and private sources--our ability to perform that mission is itself limited.
And, again, determining the degree of constraintis a sensible research question.
Research into justice also involves inquiry within the law school. Most law
professors are aware by now of questions about equity in connection with the
distribution  of jobs  in  law  schools,  and  about  access  to  legal  education,
questions that now go under the heading of "promoting diversity." I want to
focus on a different set of questions, which  I think of as 'justice within the
classroom."
Questions of justice within the classroom  take a number  of forms.  At the
outset, I should make it clear that in speaking of "the classroom," I mean to refer
to  all  the venues  in  which  law  professors  educate  students:  traditional
classrooms,  clinics,  our  offices,  social  occasions  on  which  we  meet  with
students. My  primary  point here is  that,  no less  than  on the  fundamental
questions  of jurisprudence, on questions  of justice within the classroom we
need the sort of clarification that sustained thinking-"research"-can bring.
I will identify two areas that I fiid interesting, without claiming that these
areas  are  the only ones  worth  examining. The  first  is the supposed tension
10See, e.g.,  Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Lw Practice  as a Public Calling, 49
MD. L.  REV. 255 (1990).
11 See, e.g., MARC  GALANTER &  THOMAS  PALAY, TOURNAMENT  OF LAWYERS:
THE TRANSFORMATION  OF THE BIG  LAW FIRM  (1991).
19921
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between rigor and comfort in the classroom.12 Those of us who got our legal
education before 1970 sometimes have a sense that things have changed in the
classroom,  and  not entirely  for  the  better.  We  know  that  the  terrorizing
associated with the image of Professor Kingsfield obstructed learning at least
as often as it promoted learning. Yet, we sometimes have a sense that, to avoid
becoming a new generation of Kingsfields, we may be letting students "off the
hook" too easily, accepting answers that are more diffuse than necessary  and
trying to sharpen the answers ourselves rather than pushing the students to
sharpen  them. To the extent that producing good lawyers  is part of the law
school's  justice mission,  and  to  the extent that  there  is  a  tradeoff  between
comfort  and  the rigor that helps  students become  good lawyers,  we must
consider whether there is a conflict internal to the law school's justice mission.
I do not know the answers  to these questions, which is precisely the point of
raising them here. For, surely, examining what happens in classrooms, and the
relation between what happens there and the outcome of legal education are
questions for serious research.
The second topic about justice in the classroom is related. This is the question
of social relations between students and teachers. As we have tried to make
students more comfortable in the classroom, we have opened up the possibility
that they will see us as friends as well as teachers. Yet, our position as figures
of authority--both in the psychological sense and in the material sense that we
have the power to confer rewards and punishments on our students--creates
a tension within our role. And, of course, there is projection on both sides: They
see us as more insightful than we are, and we see them as more appreciative of
our insights than they are. Finally, the demographics  of law schools  matters:
Because of changes in the recruitment patterns of law students (they are older
on entering  than they  used to be),  and changes  in  the  composition of law
faculties  (in particular, clinical  teachers  tend to be younger than non-clinical
teachers), the age differences between students and teachers have narrowed.
There are some standard answers to questions about social relations between
students  and  teachers,  the  most  common  of  which bars  close  personal
relationships  (such as those  involved  in dating) between  a student and an
instructor currently  in a position of authority over her.13 I am sympathetic  to
such  an answer, though I believe  that  it should  be taken  to  state a  strong
presumption that can be overcome in some circumstances. But, again, my aim
here is not to provide answers. Rather, I merely want to indicate that the issues
connected  with justice in the classroom provide a wide ground  for research.
12 For relevant discussions, see Anthony D'Amato, The Decline  and Fall of Law
Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism, 37 J.  LEGAL  EDUc. 461 (1987); Paul
T. Hayden, "Wrong" Answers in the Law School Classroom,  40 J.  LEGAL EDUC.  251
(1990).
13Given  the demographics  of  law  schools  regarding  both  teachers  and
students, and the ordinary distribution of behaviors, the formulation in the text
does not use the grammatical female gender to stand for both social genders.
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And, of course,  though  there may be controversy  over defining  the justice
mission  of  law  schools,  surely  there  can  be  little controversy  that  the
classroom-broadly defined-is part of the law school.
I have moved from global concerns--jurisprudence in the classical sense-to
concern with what happens in law school classrooms. At each level, I  have tried
to identify aspects of the law school's justice mission about which research is
surely needed. In that way, I have tried to show  that research is an inevitable
part of that mission.
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